Security
Interest Can Survive Commingling of Sale Proceeds
The Arizona
Court of Appeals upholds a secured supplier’s right to a claim of
“conversion” despite its failure to require segregation of monies
If a supplier
has a security interest in your inventory, does the supplier’s
failure to require you to place the sale proceeds in a separate
account weaken the security agreement?
One equipment
dealer thought so, as did a Superior Court judge. Unfortunately for
the dealer – and to the delight of wholesale suppliers – in
September 2004 the Arizona Court of Appeals saw it a different way.
Background. Case Corporation v. Gehrke involved a debt
owed by Utility Equipment Company (UEC), a dealer of trenching
equipment, backhoes and other construction equipment, to one of its
suppliers, Case Corporation. In 1990, UEC’s owner, Duane Gehrke,
acting on behalf of UEC, signed and personally guaranteed a
wholesale financing and security agreement with Case. The agreement
gave Case a security interest in all inventory (existing and future)
that Case sold to UEC, as well as the proceeds from sale of the
secured inventory. Case was to be paid the amounts due it within
seven days of sale. The security agreement also gave Case the right
to require UEC to deposit sale proceeds into a separate account to
avoid commingling with UEC’s other funds. Case did not exercise that
right, leaving UEC free to deposit proceeds from the sale of secured
inventory into their general account. Case’s decision not to require
the segregation of funds would become central to the eventual
dispute between the parties.
In December
2000, ten years after Case and UEC executed the security agreement,
UEC defaulted on the agreement by failing to remit full payment for
ten pieces of equipment that UEC had sold. Case sought to collect,
then terminated the security agreement. A week later, UEC filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In an attempt to skirt the protection of the
bankruptcy court, Case sued the Gehrkes personally in June 2002,
seeking to recover against Gehrke on his guarantee and alleging that
Gehrke had “converted” more than $600,000 in proceeds from the sale
of equipment in which Case had a security interest.
Conversion. Conversion is defined as “an act of wrongful
dominion or control over personal property in denial of or
inconsistent with the rights of another.” To maintain an action for
conversion, a plaintiff (in this instance, Case Corp.) must have the
right to immediate possession of the personal property when the
alleged conversion occurs. (A secured party like Case has the right
to immediate possession of all of its collateral upon the dealer’s
default, and that collateral is identified by serial number in the
transactional documents.) If the dealer defaults but refuses to
allow return of the remaining collateral, the secured party has a
sufficient possessory interest in that collateral to bring an action
for its conversion.
It is
relatively difficult to sue for conversion of money. A conversion
claim cannot be maintained to collect on an ordinary debt. Money can
be the subject of a conversion claim only if a specific fund “can be
described, identified or segregated, and an obligation to treat it
in a specific manner is established.”
Summary
judgment. Gehrke asked for dismissal of the conversion claim,
arguing that, before a conversion action could be brought, the
proceeds of sale would have to be placed in a separate, segregated
account or otherwise subject to an express trust. Citing two Arizona
cases, Autoville v. Friedman and Universal Marketing and
Entertainment, Inc. v. Bank One of Arizona, Gehrke contended
that, since Case had not required the segregation of sale proceeds
and allowed UEC to commingle those funds with the other monies in
its general account, Case’s conversion claim should be dismissed.
Case
responded that, non-segregation aside, its right to an action for
conversion was preserved through its ownership interest in both the
equipment and the proceeds of sale.
Siding with
Gehrke, the trial court dismissed Case’s conversion claim, finding
that “title to the inventory was in [UEC], and all proceeds were
deposited to the general corporate account of UEC before any demand
was made by Plaintiffs to segregate the funds.”
Reversal.
Case appealed the dismissal, and the Arizona Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded it for trial.
The Court
found that, when a secured party holds a security interest in the
proceeds of sale, that security interest is sufficient to identify
non-segregated funds and preserve a cause of action for conversion
of the money. The Court also ruled that neither of the decisions
cited by Gehrke applied to this case:
-
In
Autoville, the plaintiff had no security interest in either
the vehicles he provided to the defendant or the proceeds of
their sale. The plaintiff’s relationship with the defendant was
no more than that of creditor and debtor.
-
In
Universal Marketing, the plaintiff put $50,000 in an
individual’s bank account to finance purchase of a business.
Before the purchase could be completed, however, the defendant
garnished the account and seized the plaintiff’s funds. The
plaintiff could not maintain an action for conversion because it
did not take appropriate steps to identify and maintain a
possessory interest in the funds it transferred.
The Court
held that, in contrast, Case had perfected a security interest in
both the collateral and the proceeds of sale, and a security
interest in specific proceeds allows them to be identified even when
they are commingled with other funds:
“Case had a security
interest in both the equipment and in the proceeds from any sale
of the equipment. The agreement between the parties required
that the proceeds from any sale be deposited into UEC’s account
and electronically transferred to Case within seven days. On the
eighth day after the sale, if the funds were not deposited and
transferred, UEC had defaulted on the agreement and Case had the
right to immediate possession of the equipment or the proceeds.”
“We cannot accept the
Gehrkes’ argument that a security interest in proceeds is
destroyed when the debtor commingles the proceeds with other
funds. Such a decision would give the debtor the ability to
unilaterally cancel a creditor’s security interest in the
proceeds of sale and would controvert Arizona law. A.R.S. §
47-9315(B)(2) [2003]. (“Proceeds [that are not goods] that are
commingled with other property are identifiable proceeds . . .
to the extent that the secured party identifies the proceeds by
a method of tracing, including application of equitable
principles, that is permitted under law[.]”)
Gehrke
establishes a precedent for a secured party with a security interest
in sale proceeds to sue a business owner individually if that owner
fails to see that the company pays the sale proceeds required by the
financing or security agreement. This individual right of action is
separate from any personal guarantee the owner may have signed, and
it cannot be avoided by putting the business into bankruptcy. Every
owner of a business that floors vehicles, equipment or any other
personal property under a financing agreement should be aware of
this potential liability.
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